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This paper  studies  and connects  market  organization  and  activity  in the  US  collateral-
ized  interbank  market  using  an assumption-neutral  approach.  We apply  cluster  analysis  to
aggregate  activity  factors  suggested  by prior  studies  to support  two  market  organizations:
three-tier  and  core-periphery.  We  ﬁnd  that  four  bank-speciﬁc  factors  and  one  economic-
conditions  factor  explain  interbank  activity  for both  alternative  organizations.  We  also  ﬁnd
evidence that the interbank  market  organization  affects  institutions’  borrowing  and lend-
ing.  While  both  organizations  moderate  interbank  activity,  the  three-tier  structure  detects
distinct market  operations  which  are  not  represented  in  the  core-periphery  structure.
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
. Introduction
The interbank market links ﬁnancial intermediaries by a sophisticated network of multilateral exposures where risky
ctivities of some institutions are ﬁnanced using borrowed funds. Speciﬁcally, small ﬁnancial intermediaries use customer
eposits to make loans to large universal intermediaries that depend on wholesale short-term funds to ﬁnance a gamut of
isky activities. While individually these exposures may  appear safe, it is important to understand the drivers of this activity
nd how these risks behave in aggregate (Allen and Gale, 2000; Al-Suwailem, 2014). As ﬁnancial asset values fall, ﬁnancial
nstitutions experience difﬁculty in repaying current obligations, raising funds, and remaining solvent and liquid. ThroughPlease cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
ailed obligations in both collateralized (repo) and uncollateralized (federal funds) interbank markets, distress and losses can
e transmitted across institutions, markets, and economic sectors (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; Iyer and Peydro, 2011;
edeschi et al., 2012). Indeed, after the Lehman bankruptcy, repo haircuts ballooned some 43% (Gorton and Metrick, 2012)
nd the market retreated from $5.5 trillion in 2007 to $3.9 trillion in 2014 (Copeland et al., 2012, 2014).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: mikhail.v.oet@clev.frb.org, mikhail.oet@case.edu (M.V. Oet), song@clev.frb.org (S.J. Ong).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
275-5319/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Studies of interbank market organization generally focus on a set of rules which classify banks according to the individual
trades they make. The interbank market organization that results is subject to the trading rules used for classiﬁcation (Bech
and Atalay, 2010; Craig and von Peter, 2014). A second strand of research seeks to shed light on the determinants of interbank
market activity (e.g. King, 2008; Ashcraft et al., 2011). This paper connects these two strands of literature by completing an
empirical study of interbank market organization and leveraging the results to understand the drivers of interbank activity.
Focus is placed on answering three research questions. First, what is the organization of the US collateralized interbank
market? Second, what factors explain activity in this market? Third, how and to what extent do these factors and market
organization interact?
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our research data and methods. Section 3 proposes
falsiﬁable hypotheses regarding the organization of the interbank market and the principal functions of bank intermediaries
relying on this market. The results in Section 4 identify market organization and connect it to the interbank activities. The
discussion in Section 5 concludes.
We contribute three main ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd competing evidence of two alternative organizations of the US collat-
eralized interbank market: core-periphery and three-tier. Second, we ﬁnd that for both alternative organizations, interbank
activities are associated with two exogenous factors – (1) economic conditions, (2) change in liquidity – and further mediated
by three endogenous factors of institutional performance – (3) change in leverage, (4) change in return, and (5) balance sheet
growth. Third, we demonstrate that the moderating effect of market organization on interbank activity results in different
behavior between the tiers. In particular, we ﬁnd that the three-tier partition marginally outperforms the core-periphery
partition in explaining the variance in US interbank market activity.
2. Research design
2.1. Data
The dataset consists of balance sheets drawn from the quarterly Federal Reserve Call Reports (031 and 041) between
3/31/1992 and 6/30/2014, supplemented by economic and monetary policy series from the Board of Governors releases (H.6
and H.15) and Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). We select the top 100 US bank holding companies (BHCs) by total
assets as of June 30, 2014 (aggregated to the bank holding company level). For this sample, the 22-year dataset comprises a
30-item measurement scale composed of quarterly data on net interbank activities, institutional balance sheet stocks and
ﬂows, and macroeconomic conditions.
There are seven series we associate with the change in liquidity – change and growth in cash to liabilities, change and
growth in cash equivalents to total expense, change in reserves, change in cash equivalents, and growth in short term
liquidity to assets. There are four leverage series – change and growth in liabilities to assets, and change and growth in assets
to capital. There are four growth series – growth in total assets, growth in total liabilities, growth in deposits, and growth
of the mismatch between assets and liabilities maturing in the next six months. There are four series reﬂecting the change
in return – change in pre- and post-tax return on equity, and change in pre- and post-tax return on assets. There are four
series reﬂecting the growth in securities – change and growth in securities available for sale, and the change and growth
in securities to assets. There are three series associated with the growth in proﬁtability – growth in net interest margin,
growth in revenue to assets, and growth in interest income to assets. There are four economic conditions series – inﬂation
measured by personal consumption less energy and food, output measured by real GDP, money supply measured by M2,
and the natural rate of unemployment.
2.2. Methods
We  use cluster analysis of quarterly data to determine potential grouping of our population of banks into distinct tiers.1
Cluster analysis is appropriate for such a study due to the assumption-neutral way  it classiﬁes observations. We  employ the
two-step methodology proposed by Chiu et al. (2001) which extends the BIRCH algorithm developed by Zhang et al. (1996).
The distance measure between two clusters (or observations) is related to the decrease in the log-likelihood function as they
are combined into one cluster under the assumption that continuous variables and categorical variables follow the normal
and multinomial distributions respectively. It is also assumed that variables and observations are independent. Appendix A
in Supplements provides further mathematical details for cluster analysis.
We  apply exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to investigate whether variables from the 30-item scale dataset of institutional
balance sheets and macroeconomic conditions are adequately correlated and meet criteria of reliability and validity. SincePlease cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
EFA does not rely upon assumptions about how variables should be grouped, it is appropriate for an initial investigation of
the effect that latent factors may  exert on observable measures. Each factor “summarize[s] the interrelationships among
[variables] in a concise but accurate manner as an aid in conceptualization” (Gorsuch, 1983: 2). We  allow the common factors
1 It should be noted that usage of quarterly balance sheet data to partition the interbank market is suggested as a viable alternative by studies of
transactional data. For example, after partitioning institutions according to their transactions for the German interbank market, Craig and von Peter (2014)
ﬁnd that the membership of banks could be predicted reasonably well based purely upon aggregate reporting of bank size.
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1Fig. 1. Models of interbank organization.
o be correlated and include idiosyncratic behavior through observation errors. To support meaningful interpretation from
his measurement model we require that the factors are: common across observations, invariant to interbank organization
uring measurement, and signiﬁcantly explain interbank activity.
To better understand the primary drivers of interbank activity we  seek causal interpretation (Pearl, 2012) through a latent
actor model (Bollen, 1989) (see Supplements, Appendix B for further mathematical details). We  specify a latent factor
odel drawing upon literature to explain interbank activity through a set of falsiﬁable hypotheses. This model includes
actors that may  have direct inﬂuence on interbank activity alongside factors with a potential indirect (mediated) inﬂuence.
he measurement of factors is invariant; however, we allow interbank tiers to inﬂuence the strength and character of the
stimated relationships among the model factors.
. Hypothesis development
In this section, we build on current literature to develop a model of interbank activity wherein the change in leverage,
hange in return, and growth serve as measures of ﬁnancial performance which mediate the effect of changes in liquidity and
conomic conditions on observable interbank activity. We  develop three sets of testable hypotheses to address our research
uestions. First, the organization hypotheses (H1 and H2) examine the structure of the US interbank market. Second, the
easurement model (H3), direct association (H4), and mediation hypotheses (H5 and H6) connect economic conditions and
ank speciﬁc factors to interbank market activity. Third, the moderation hypotheses (H8–H11) examine the extent to which
he model of interbank activity is affected by interbank market organization.
.1. Interbank market organization
Several authors have studied the organization of interbank markets empirically. Craig and von Peter (2014) examine the
rganization of all institutions participating in the German interbank market using direct bilateral exposure data between
1:1999 and Q4:2007. They posit the existence of a rule-deﬁned core-periphery organization wherein core banks (small
raction of banks that borrow and lend) are assumed to trade between themselves and with the periphery. The distinguish-
ng feature of periphery banks is that they can only interact with core banks.2 In a similar study of the US federal funds
arket, Bech and Atalay (2010) apply the Furﬁne (1999) methodology to infer bilateral exposures using data from April
997 to December 2006. They propose the existence of ﬁve groups, which trade according to several rules.3 Unsurprisingly,
he structural changes in the interbank market lead to alternative views of the US interbank market organization.4 One per-
istent view of the US interbank market since the late 1980s is a three-tier organization (Allen and Saunders, 1986; Stigum
nd Crescenzi, 2007). Allen and Saunders (1986) differentiate the tiers as primary interdealer market banks, intermediary
orrespondents, and smaller banks lacking direct access to the primary market. Based on extensive interviews with marketPlease cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
articipants, Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) describe the interbank market in terms of money center banks, regional banks,
nd smaller banks. The three alternative models of interbank organization – core-periphery, ﬁve-group, and three-tier – are
llustrated in Fig. 1.
2 Craig and von Peter (2014) ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvement upon Erdos–Renyi and scale-free networks and are able to generalize their method to consider
 K-tier organizational scheme. For the German interbank system they ﬁnd a 17% error rate in network link identiﬁcation for 3 tiers compared to 12% for 2
iers.
3 The giant strongly connected component (GSCC) composed of nodes that are connected to every other node in the GSCC through a directed path: the
iant  in-component (GIN) (resp. giant out-component (GOUT)) with nodes connected to the GSCC by a directed path in but not out (resp. from but not to) the
SCC;  the tendrils that are connected to the GSCC only through a path of mixed lending and borrowing links; and the disconnected component with nodes,
hich  participate in the federal funds market but are completely disconnected from the GSCC. Bech and Atalay (2010: 12–14) ﬁnd the following allocation
f  institutions among the ﬁve groups: GSCC = 10% (±1%), G-IN = 58% (±5%), G-OUT = 17% (±4%), Tendrils = 14% (±3%); such that ∼7.2% were borrowing from
IN,  ∼4.8% were lending to GOUT, and ∼2.3% of tendrils were borrowing from GIN and lending to GOUT. The disconnected component contained less than
%  (±1%) of institutions.
4 Furﬁne (1999), Soramaki et al. (2007), and Battiston et al. (2012) have also considered multi-tiered systems.
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It is reasonable to expect that our dataset of the top 100 BHCs ﬁlters out the disconnected group with 1% of all participants
(Bech and Atalay, 2010). Reconsidering Bech and Atalay (2010) ﬁndings (with the omission of transaction directionality
but recognizing net transaction activity), the US interbank market may  be represented as a core-periphery organization
consistent with Craig and von Peter (2014). In this representation, the core component is likely coincident with the GSCC
group (Bech and Atalay, 2010), while the periphery component is likely coincident with the combined GIN, GOUT, and
Tendrils groups. Alternatively, the US interbank organization may  be represented as a three-tier organization consistent
with Allen and Saunders (1986) and Stigum and Crescenzi (2007), where the GSCC group is likely coincident with tier 1,
while GIN, GOUT, and Tendrils (differentiated by interbank activity share) form tiers 2 and 3.
Exploratory analysis of characteristics of interbank market participants suggests that market organization exists as a
latent construct that can be measured using relevant characteristics of ﬁnancial intermediaries: interbank lending, interbank
borrowing, interbank pass-through,5 rank, and total assets. To establish the validity of this construct the institutional char-
acteristics must both reliably converge on the latent construct (convergent validity) and be mutually distinct (discriminant
validity) (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).
Hypothesis 1 (H1). A construct of core-periphery interbank market organization is formed by the ﬁve indicators of interbank
lending, interbank borrowing, interbank pass-through, rank, and assets, such that the silhouette measure of cohesion and
separation6 exceeds 0.5.7
Hypothesis 2 (H2). A construct of three-tiered interbank market organization is formed by the ﬁve indicators of interbank
lending, interbank borrowing, interbank pass-through, rank, and assets, such that the silhouette measure of cohesion and
separation exceeds 0.5.
3.2. Formation of measurement, direct association, and mediation hypotheses
3.2.1. Measurement model hypotheses
“Contemporary banking theory classiﬁes banking functions into four main categories: offering liquidity and payment
services, transforming assets, managing risks, processing information and monitoring” (Freixas and Rochet, 2008:2). We
consider the collected 30-item dataset in terms of these four functional categories. The risk management function reﬂects
changing economic conditions, which may  be handled through adjustment of the growth in securities, the change in leverage,
the change in return, and proﬁtability growth. The change in liquidity factor reﬂects the larger liquidity provision function.
The growth factor reﬂects the larger asset transformation function. Information processing and monitoring may not be
observable in the collected dataset.
We propose that seven latent factors of economic conditions, change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return,
growth, growth in securities, and proﬁtability growth reliably measure the variance of our sample dataset. Accordingly, these
seven latent factors should possess high correlation within each factor, low correlation between factors, and be consistently
measured across all market participants.
Hypothesis 3 (H3a). Seven distinct factors of economic conditions, change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in
return, growth, growth in securities, and proﬁtability growth converge to a reliable measurement model such that each
factor achieves:8
(H3b). Reliability, such that each factor’s composite reliability (CR) exceeds 0.70.
(H3c). Convergent validity, such that the unique one-to-one factor loading is shown by the factor components with average
variance extracted (AVE) exceeding 0.50 and CR exceeding AVE.
(H3d). Discriminant validity, such that for each factor AVE exceeds maximum shared variance (MSV), and AVE exceeds
average shared variance (ASV).
(H3e). The factor measurement model is invariant, such that at 95% conﬁdence there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference
in the factor construction between the interbank market structural groups or conﬁgural invariance can be demonstrated.
3.2.2. Direct association hypotheses
We consider the direct effect that a change in monetary policy, economic conditions, leverage, liquidity, overall growth,Please cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
or return would have upon interbank activity through three perspectives: (1) ﬁnancial intermediation as delegated monitor-
ing, (2) bank portfolio management, and (3) bank funding. First, interbank participants cross-monitor counterparty liquidity,
leverage, return, and growth to inform pricing and collateral margins relative to economic conditions (Rochet and Tirole,
5 The interbank pass-through value is deﬁned as the minimum of interbank borrowing and lending at quarterly time t. It measures the institution’s role
as  a conduit of funding.
6 See Rousseeuw (1987).
7 See Kaufman and Rousseeuw (2009).
8 See Hair et al., (2010). More detailed discussion of test statistics is provided in Section 4.2.
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996; Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Second, portfolio management determines the leverage banks use, the liquidity risk expo-
ure, and the return banks eventually realize dependent on economic conditions (Farrugia et al., 2011; Moshirian and Wu,
012; Bagliano and Morana, 2014). Portfolio management is generally considered a fundamental behavior of ﬁnancial inter-
ediaries (e.g. Hart and Jaffee, 1974; Koehn and Santomero, 1980).9 From the third (funding) perspective, banks “ﬁnance
heir assets with interbank funds” (Rochet and Vives, 2004: 1117) and pledge assets as collateral in the interbank market
Freixas et al., 2004; Brunnermeier, 2009).10 Thus, we make the simplifying hypothesis that direct associations between
conomic conditions, change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, growth, and interbank activity are consistent
ith the literature.
ypothesis 4 (H4). At 95% conﬁdence, the latent factors of economic conditions (H4a), change in liquidity (H4b), change in
everage (H4c), change in return (H4d), and growth (H4e), in addition to monetary policy (H4f) are signiﬁcantly associated
ith interbank borrowing.
ypothesis 5 (H5). At 95% conﬁdence, the latent factors of economic conditions (H5a), change in liquidity (H5b), change in
everage (H5c), change in return (H5d), and growth (H5e), in addition to monetary policy (H5f) are signiﬁcantly associated
ith interbank lending.
.2.3. Mediation hypotheses
The empirical studies of Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and King and Levine (1993) ﬁnd a positive
ssociation between economic growth and ﬁnancial development. Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) consider interbank
ctivity as insurance against changes in returns and liquidity. Holmström and Tirole (2001) model assets as cushion against
iquidity shocks that condition interbank activity. Heider et al. (2008) ﬁnd that variation in economic conditions affects
nterbank activity through risk in counterparty assets. The ﬁnancial accelerator effect (Bernanke et al., 1999) also plays a
ole in the connection between macroeconomic conditions and banking through the mediating inﬂuence of banks’ balance
heets. Speciﬁcally, “as balance sheets strengthen with improved economic conditions, the external ﬁnance problem declines,
hich works to enhance borrower spending, thus enhancing the boom. . . . In this framework, a crisis is a situation where
alance sheets of borrowers deteriorate sharply, possibly associated with a sharp deterioration in asset prices, causing the
xternal ﬁnance premium to jump . . . [creating] strains in the interbank market” (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010). Pasiouras
nd Kosmidou (2007) and Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) ﬁnd that economic conditions and leverage signiﬁcantly impact return,
hrough which they may  in turn indirectly inﬂuence interbank positions. Finally, economic conditions are typically addressed
y policy makers through monetary policy instruments such as the federal funds rate, which acts as the reference price of
uch interbank activity (Stigum, 1989). Thus, both theoretical and empirical literature supports the parsimonious view of
onetary policy, growth, change in return, and change in leverage as mediators of economic conditions, changes in liquidity,
hanges in leverage, and changes in return, and their effect on interbank activity.11
ypothesis 6 (H6). At 95% conﬁdence, the relationships of economic conditions (H6a), change in liquidity (H6b), change
n leverage (H6c), and change in return (H6d) with interbank borrowing are mediated by the changes in leverage, change in
eturn, growth, and monetary policy.
ypothesis 7 (H7). At 95% conﬁdence, the relationships of economic conditions (H7a), change in liquidity (H7b), change
n leverage (H7c), and change in return (H7d) with interbank lending are mediated by changes in leverage, change in return,
rowth, and monetary policy.
.3. Formation of moderation hypotheses: Multi-group boundary conditions
.3.1. Multi-group structural variance
A number of studies (Allen and Saunders, 1986; Allen et al., 1989; King, 2008; Ashcraft et al., 2011) ﬁnd that interbank
arket activity varies with interbank market organization. Allen et al. (1989: 502–503) mention three ways size may  impact
ank participation in the interbank market.
First, Allen and Saunders (1986) posit that institutions that deal with each other frequently (e.g. Tier 1 or Core) set
igher spreads on transactions with relatively unfamiliar institutions (e.g. Tier 2, Tier 3, or Periphery) due to counterpartyPlease cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
nformation asymmetries. In a panel study of commercial bank data from 1986 to 2005, King (2008: 295) offers the supporting
vidence “that high-risk banks have consistently paid more than safe banks for interbank loans and have been less likely to
se these loans as a source of liquidity.” While all banks are subject to differentiated discount window rates,12 many authors
9 From this perspective, the extant banks can be viewed as successful portfolio managers, taking exogenous ﬂows and choosing a return and growth rate
to  maximize the expectation. . . of the bank’s ﬁnancial net worth” (Rochet, 1992: 1139).
10 See also Heider et al. (2008: 2) who show how “banks’ asset risks affects funding liquidity in the interbank market” in addition to Acharya and Skeie
2011) who  study the effect that leverage of a bank has on its access to the interbank market in the presence of adverse economic conditions reﬂected by
ow  market liquidity.
11 See also Pagano (1993), Coccorese (2004), and Baum et al. (2009).
12 The Federal Reserve Discount Window offers short-term credit at the prime or secondary rates, both above the federal funds rate.
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argue that money center banks beneﬁt from an implicit preferential liquidity backstop, a form of too-big-to-fail insurance
by the central bank (e.g., Freixas et al., 2000: 627).
Second, Ho and Saunders (1985) propose that “managers of smaller regional banks may  choose to rely on traditional
“deposit-taking” techniques of funds production for reasons of risk aversion.” An alternative is that due to a lack of com-
petition smaller banks may  serve regions in which they are able to collect deposits at below market rates (Rose and Kolari,
1985; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988).13 Geographic expansion can be expected to pressure the expanding small banks to offer
uniform rates across their branches, thus reducing their local deposit funding advantage and increasing the cost effectiveness
of borrowing in the interbank market.
Third, Ashcraft et al. (2011: 26) build a model for intraday activity in the interbank market, according to which “Smaller
banks hold larger average scaled amounts of nonborrowed reserves overnight than do large banks.” Their model implies
that small banks due to their relatively larger reserve balances will in general have weaker relationships with interbank
borrowing and lending than large banks.
Therefore, we propose that the latent factor model relating economic conditions, the change in liquidity, change in
leverage, change in return, and growth with interbank activity will vary signiﬁcantly by market organization (Hypothesis 8).
Moreover, the theoretical and empirical studies above suggest that the interbank market organization creates a stronger asso-
ciation between the latent factors and interbank activity for money center banks than for smaller institutions (Hypotheses
9 and 10).
Hypothesis 8 (H8). At 95% conﬁdence, the structural model relating economic conditions, change in liquidity, change in
leverage, change in return, and growth to interbank borrowing and lending activity is variant, such that there is a statistically
signiﬁcant difference in the latent factor model relationships between the interbank market structural groups.
Hypothesis 9 (H9). Interbank market organization will moderate the strength of the direct and mediated relationships
between economic conditions (H9a), the change in liquidity (H9b), the change in leverage (H9c), the change in return (H9d),
growth (H9e), and monetary policy (H9f) with interbank borrowing, such that the relationship will be stronger for lower
Tiers (Tier 1 stronger than Tier 2, which is in turn stronger than Tier 3, or Core stronger than Periphery).
Hypothesis 10 (H10). Interbank market organization will moderate the strength of the direct and mediated relationships
between economic conditions (H10a), the change in liquidity (H10b), the change in leverage (H10c), the change in return
(H10d), growth (H10e), and monetary policy (H9f) with interbank lending, such that the relationship will be stronger for
lower Tiers (Tier 1 stronger than Tier 2, which is stronger than Tier 3, or Core stronger than Periphery).
3.3.2. Alternative interbank market organizations
The dominant ﬁndings in recent literature suggest that the core-periphery organization found for the German interbank
market by Craig and von Peter (2014) may  be pervasive. The core-periphery organization has been veriﬁed as a “stylized fact
of interbank markets” in Netherlands (in’t Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014: 27), UK (Langﬁeld et al., 2014), and Italy (Fricke and
Lux, 2014). At the same time, the authors ﬁnd some room for alternative representations and acknowledge the common
limitations of their network analysis. Langﬁeld et al. (2014) state “that the UK interbank market closely approximates a
core-periphery organization, but that the closeness of this approximation, and the composition of the optimal core, changes
signiﬁcantly across market instruments.” Similarly, in’t Veld and van Lelyveld (2014) acknowledge that “While the core has a
higher average size than the periphery, we observe that the group of core banks can be divided in the small set of the largest
banks, and an additional group of medium-sized banks of a size similar to many periphery banks.” Given the support for the
core-periphery interpretation of the European interbank markets, we hypothesize that the core-periphery organization will
also allow a superior explanation of the US interbank market than the alternative three-tier model observed.
Hypothesis 11 (H11). Core-periphery structural moderation is superior to three-tier structural moderation of the latent
factor model relating economic conditions, change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, and growth to interbank
activity, demonstrated by the sample multivariate goodness-of-ﬁt statistics.
4. Results
4.1. Interbank market tiering
Hypotheses H1 and H2 are tested and supported by the silhouette measure of cohesion and separation (SMCS) value ofPlease cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
0.5298 for the core-periphery organization and SMCS of 0.5469 for the three-tier organization respectively, decomposed
by the variables used for cluster analysis and discussed in Supplements (Appendix A). Descriptive statistics for total assets,
asset ranking, interbank borrowing, interbank lending, and interbank pass-through are provided in Table 1.
13 See Freixas and Rochet (2008: 81–84) and Salop (1979).
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of cluster analysis dataset.
N Min. Max. Mean S.E. Std. Variance Skewness S.E. Kurtosis S.E (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Ranking 6774 1.00 100.00 42.56 0.30 25.02 625.99 0.14 0.03 −1.03 0.06 1
(2) Assets+ 6774 −9.25 −1.25 −6.02 0.02 1.56 2.45 0.87 0.03 0.38 0.06 −0.92*** 1
(3) IB lending+ 6774 −20.79 −0.64 −10.26 0.06 5.03 25.34 −0.85 0.03 0.11 0.06 −0.60*** 0.58*** 1
(4)  IB borrowing+ 6774 −20.86 −0.94 −7.80 0.05 4.01 16.08 −1.79 0.03 3.55 0.06 −0.62*** 0.65*** 0.40*** 1
(5)  IB Pass-through+ 6774 −20.62 −0.64 −10.77 0.06 5.30 28.07 −0.64 0.03 −0.46 0.06 −0.65*** 0.65*** 0.91*** 0.65*** 1
Note: The properties describe the fully (share- and log-) transformed data, denoted +.  is the Pearson correlation which is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), denoted by ***.
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Table 2
Correlative validity.
Table 3
Reliability and validity.
Reliability and validity metrics Factor correlation matrix
CA CR AVE MSV  ASV Change in
liquidity
Economic
conditions
Change in
leverage
Change in
return
Growth Growth in
securities
Proﬁtability
growth
Change in liquidity 0.87 0.97 0.90 0.09 0.02 0.95
Economic conditions 0.95 0.91 0.73 0.09 0.03 0.31 0.85
Change in leverage 0.98 0.96 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.92
Change in return 0.93 0.87 0.52 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.72
Growth 0.92 0.92 0.74 0.01 0.00 −0.09 −0.05 0.00 0.01 0.86
Growth in securities 0.85 0.82 0.56 0.05 0.01 0.05 −0.02 −0.01 −0.22 0.00 0.75
Proﬁtability growth 0.89 0.87 0.70 0.05 0.01 −0.15 −0.23 0.01 −0.07 0.08 −0.04 0.84
Note: Italicized diagonal of the factor correlation matrix shows square root of AVE.
4.2. Measurement, direct association, and mediation
4.2.1. Structure in variable data
Hypothesis H3 requires that seven distinct factors, the change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, growth,
growth in securities, proﬁtability growth, and economic conditions adequately describe variation in our dataset. We test this
through EFA using IBM SPSS Statistics software, then by examining overall model and multi-group ﬁt through conﬁrmatory
factor analysis (CFA) in IBM SPSS AMOS.
EFA using principal component extraction, Promax rotation, and Kaiser normalization supports the identiﬁcation of seven
distinct factors among the observed items (pattern matrix for factors is provided in Supplements, Appendix B). Further
support for H3a, correlative validity of the identiﬁed factors, is provided by examining the correlation matrix organized
by factors. Items that load onto a particular factor should correlate strongly with each other, while correlations with other
factors’ loadings should not be strong. Visual examination of Table 2 supports the convergent validity of the factor deﬁnitions,
evidenced by strong correlations among items that are expected to load distinctly into unique factors. Discriminant validity
of the factor deﬁnitions is also supported, since fewer than 10% of all items exhibit medium-size (0.2–0.5 range) correlations.
The EFA results are used to set up a ﬁrst order CFA measurement model. Formal tests for reliability (H3b), convergent
validity (H3c), discriminant validity (H3d), and measurement model invariance (H3e) are discussed below.Please cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
The reliability of each factor is supported by a Cronbach Alpha (CA) statistic14 satisfying the 0.7 threshold (Peterson
and Kim, 2013) in Table 3. The composite reliability for factor F (CRF), a measure of aggregate factor reliability, following
Fornell and Larcker (1981) is deﬁned according to Eq. (1) where j is the loading of component j, and 2εj is the variance
14 The Cronbach Alpha (CA) statistic of factor reliability is measured as CA = k
k−1
2x −
∑
2
i
2x
where 2
i
is variance of individual k factor items and 2x is the
factor  variance (e.g., Crocker and Algina, 1986).
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Table  4
Goodness-of-ﬁt metrics.
Sample CFI RMSEA Standardized RMR
All observations 0.819 0.141 0.0650
o
f
m
(
(
n
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b
s
f
b
t
t
a
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e
(
s
m
a
t
i
t
4
l
s
gCore-periphery partition 0.817 0.102 0.0686
Three-tiered partition 0.815 0.085 0.0698
f the measurement error of component j. Bagozzi and Yi (1988) suggest 0.7 as an adequate threshold for CRF. We test
or convergent validity, deﬁned by Krippendorff (2012) as the “extent to which results correlate with variables known to
easure the same phenomena and considered valid,” using the Average Variance Extracted of factor F (AVEF) following Eq.
2). Convergent validity is supported if AVEF is greater than 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) and if AVEF is greater than CRF
Byrne, 2013). We  analyze the discriminant validity, the idea that the variances of latent factor F and any other sample do
ot overlap, through the Maximum Shared Variance (MSVF) and the Average Shared Variance of factor F (ASVF), following
qs. (3) and (4) respectively. The hypothesis test criteria that AVEF is greater than MSVF, and AVEF is greater than ASVF can
e found in Hair et al. (2010).
CRF =
(∑C
j=1j
)2
(∑C
j=1j
)2
+∑Cj=12εj
(1)
AVEF =
(∑C
j=1
2
j
)
(∑C
j=1
2
j
)
+∑Cj=12εj (2)
MSVF = max
J /=  K
(2j,K ) = maxJ /=  K
[(
cov(j, K)
JK
)2]
= max
J /=  K
⎡
⎣
(
E
[(
J − J
)
(K − K )
]
JK
)2⎤⎦ (3)
ASVF = max
J,K ∈ F
(2J,K ) (4)
In Table 3 we show that the composite reliability metrics for each factor are well above the threshold of 0.7 required,
upporting factor reliability (H3b). The average variance extracted is between 0.5 and the composite reliability for each
actor which supports convergent validity (H3c). Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the average variance extracted is greater than
oth the maximum shared variance and the average shared variance for each factor supporting the discriminant validity of
he latent factors (H3d).
Next, we consider the conﬁgural invariance for the measurement model by comparing its goodness-of-ﬁt statistics in
he context of the model’s multi-group partitions, as summarized in Table 4. Hair et al. (2010) state that “One key point
cross the results is that simpler models and smaller samples should be subject to more strict evaluation than are more
omplex models with larger samples.” The measurement model in this study satisﬁes both the complexity (30 variables
nd 7 factors) and large sample size (over 6000 observations) considerations. The comparative ﬁt index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990)
ecreases when the sample is partitioned along either the core-periphery or three-tier interbank market organization, and in
ach case it fails to meet the 0.9 threshold suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999). The root mean square error of approximation
RMSEA) (Steiger and Lind, 1980) metrics for each model are close or satisfy (for the three-tier model) the 0.1 threshold
uggested by Hu and Bentler (1999). Finally, the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) is close to but does not
eet the 0.05 threshold suggested by Byrne (2013) for well-ﬁtting models.15 Allowing for ﬂexibility when determining
dequate thresholds for the goodness-of-ﬁt statistics due to model complexity and the large sample size, we suggest that
he CFA measurement model is close but does not support conﬁgural invariance. However, as an alternative to conﬁgural
nvariance we  test for and are able to support metric invariance following Gaskin (2012) and Gaskin and Godfrey (2014) and
hereby satisfying hypothesis H3e (Supplements, Appendix B).
.2.2. Direct associations
We test the direct association of the ﬁve latent factors and monetary policy with interbank borrowing and interbankPlease cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
ending through a straightforward estimation of the structural equation model presented in Fig. 2 (Panel A) using the entire
ample. Table 5 indicates that several portions of Hypotheses 4 and 5 are supported, particularly the signiﬁcance of return,
rowth, and economic conditions.
15 The 2/df metric is not considered since Satorra and Bentler (2001) ﬁnd that it is sensitive to non-normal data which is present in this dataset.
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Fig. 2. Latent factor model for direct association and mediation testing.
Table 5
Direct association results.
Hypothesis Proposition Direct beta Hypothesis outcome
H4a Economic conditions ↗ Relative interbank borrowing −0.191*** Supported
H5a  Economic conditions ↗ Relative interbank lending −0.120*** Supported
H4b  Change in liquidity ↗ Relative interbank borrowing 0.025* Not supported
H5b  Change in liquidity ↗ Relative interbank lending 0.015 Not supported
H4c  Change in leverage ↗ Relative interbank borrowing 0.008 Not supported
H5c  Change in leverage ↗ Relative interbank lending −0.014 Not supported
H4d  Change in return ↗ Relative interbank borrowing −0.088*** Supported
H5d  Change in return ↗ Relative interbank lending −0.095*** Supported
H4e  Growth ↗ Relative interbank borrowing −0.071*** Supported
H5e  Growth ↗ Relative interbank lending 0.005 Not supported
H4f  Monetary policy ↗ Relative interbank borrowing 0.013 Not supported
H5f  Monetary policy ↗ Relative interbank lending 0.023* Not supported
Note: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
4.2.3. Mediated associations
We test the mediation relationships proposed in Hypotheses 6 and 7 using the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach (esti-
mating the model without and then with mediators) which are illustrated in Fig. 2 Panel B. Results are provided in Table 6.
Mediation hypotheses are tested via bootstrapping (2000 samples with 95% bias-corrected conﬁdence level). We  ﬁnd that
Hypotheses 5 and 6 are both supported for several relationships; however, the nature of intermediation varies.
4.3. Moderation
4.3.1. Moderation of interbank market organization
We  incorporate the interbank market organization as a consideration of interbank activity in the latent factor model
described in Fig. 2. We  test for signiﬁcant differences in model coefﬁcients between groups using the 2 test with H0
expecting model invariance. The results are presented in Table 7. There is signiﬁcant difference in the chi-squared values
between constrained and unconstrained versions of the model for both the core-periphery and three-tier interbank market
organizations supporting Hypothesis 8. In Table 8 we  explore the moderation of direct relationships and ﬁnd signiﬁcant
evidence in support of moderation for several direct relationships. The results of testing moderation for the mediated
relationships are detailed in Supplements, Appendix B3.
4.3.2. Comparison of alternative interbank market organizations
Motivated by the desire for a better structural representation of the interbank market, we  attempt to determine which
decomposition of the interbank market is more useful. To this end we compare the goodness of ﬁt for the latent factor model
presented in Fig. 2 Panel B for individual partitions of the interbank market and provide the results in Table 9. Model ﬁt is
best when all observations are included simultaneously. This is not surprising, since the latent factor model was  selected
to optimize the model ﬁt for the entire sample. Interestingly, the ﬁt of each segment of the three-tier model is superior to
any segment of the core-periphery model. Tier 2 appears to behave signiﬁcantly differently from Tiers 1 and 3.16 Therefore,Please cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
a possible cause of the decrease in model ﬁt is that the core and periphery each contain portions of Tier 2 which behaves
distinctly. This result must be taken with some discretion, since it is also natural to expect that a model which allows
calibration with more groups may  achieve a better ﬁt.
16 The distinct behavior of Tier 2 can be seen in Table 8 through the coefﬁcient difference tests in Panel B. Also, in Appendix B we test for the moderation of
mediated relationships and ﬁnd that the three-tier organization recognizes less moderation of mediated relationships than the core-periphery organization.
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Table  6
Mediation testing results.
Hypothesis Proposition Direct beta w/o
Med.
Direct beta
w/Med.
indirect beta Mediation
observed
Hypothesis
outcome
H6a-1 Economic conditions ↗ Change in
return ↗ Relative interbank borrowing
−0.191*** −0.191*** 0.000 No
mediation
Not
supported
H7a-1  Economic conditions ↗ Change in
return ↗ Relative interbank lending
−0.120*** −0.120*** 0.000 No
mediation
Not
supported
H6a-2 Economic conditions ↗ Growth ↗
Relative interbank borrowing
−0.191*** −0.191*** −0.001 No
mediation
Not
supported
H7a-2  Economic conditions ↗ Growth ↗
Relative interbank lending
−0.120*** −0.120*** 0.000 No
mediation
Not
supported
H6a-3  Economic conditions ↗ Monetary
policy ↗ Relative interbank borrowing
−0.191*** −0.211*** 0.011 No
mediation
Not
supported
H7a-3  Economic Conditions ↗ Monetary
Policy ↗ Relative interbank lending
−0.120*** −0.133*** −0.006 No
mediation
Not
supported
H6b-1  Change in Liquidity ↗ Change in
leverage ↗ Relative interbank
borrowing
0.024* 0.024* 0.000 No
mediation
Not
supported
H7b-1  Change in liquidity ↗ Change in
leverage ↗ Relative interbank lending
0.015 0.015 0.000 No
mediation
Not
supported
H6b-2  Change in liquidity ↗ Change in return
↗ Relative interbank borrowing
0.024* 0.024* −0.002 No
mediation
Not
supported
H7b-2  Change in liquidity ↗ Change in return
↗ Relative interbank lending
0.015 0.015 −0.002 No
mediation
Not
supported
H6b-3  Change in Liquidity ↗ Growth ↗
Relative interbank borrowing
0.024* 0.025* −0.011*** Full
mediation
Supported
H7b-4  Change in liquidity ↗ Growth ↗
Relative interbank lending
0.015 0.015 0.001 No
mediation
Not
supported
H6c-1  Change in Leverage ↗Change in Return
↗  Relative interbank borrowing
0.008 0.007 0.008*** Full
mediation
Supported
H7c-1  Change in leverage ↗ Change in return
↗ Relative interbank lending
−0.014 −0.015 0.009*** Full
mediation
Supported
H6c-2  Change in leverage ↗ Growth ↗
Relative interbank borrowing
0.008 0.010 −0.022*** Full
mediation
Supported
H7c-2  Change in leverage ↗ Growth ↗
Relative interbank lending
−0.014 −0.014 0.001 No
mediation
Not
supported
H6d-1  Change in return ↗ Growth ↗ Relative
interbank borrowing
−0.088*** −0.088*** 0.002*** Partial
mediation
Supported
H7d-1  Change in return ↗ Growth ↗ Relative −0.095*** −0.094*** 0.000 No Not
N
5
t
o
c
m
a
a
T
Iinterbank lending mediation supported
ote: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
. Discussion
This study combines two distinct strands of literature which investigate the organization of the interbank market and
he determinants of institutions’ interbank activity. In contrast to prior studies of interbank market organization that focus
n transactional data to connect speciﬁc borrowers and lenders, this paper utilizes aggregate institutional activity in the
ollateralized interbank market. Cluster analysis of bank data leads to competing evidence of core-periphery and three-tierPlease cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
arket organizations.
Our second empirical ﬁnding is that ﬁve latent factors, as hypothesized, explain the variance in the interbank activity data
cross tiers. Speciﬁcally, three factors – economic conditions, change in return, and balance sheet growth – are signiﬁcantly
nd directly associated with interbank activity. In addition, two factors – change in liquidity and change in leverage – have
able 7
nvariance to interbank market organization (H8).
Chi-square df p-val Invariant?
Panel A: Core-periphery organization
Unconstrained 1.855 10
Fully constrained 245.807 31
Number of groups 2
Difference 243.952 21 0.00 No
Panel  A: Three-tier organization
Unconstrained 0.932 15
Fully constrained 383.523 57
Number of groups 3
Difference 382.591 42 0.00 No
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Table  8
Multi-group moderation.
Panel A: Core-periphery moderation Unconstrained std. coefﬁcients Direct moderation
z-score
Hyp.  Path Predicted Core Periphery Core vs.
Periphery
Hypothesis outcome
H9a-d Economic conditions ↗ Relative
interbank borrowing
Core > Periphery −0.346*** −0.099*** 4.47*** Supported
H10a-d Economic conditions ↗ Relative
interbank lending
Core > Periphery 0.015 −0.251*** −2.461** Supported
H9b-d Change in liquidity ↗ Relative
interbank borrowing
Core > Periphery −0.002 0.035** 1.435 Not supported
H10b-d Change in liquidity ↗ Relative
interbank lending
Core > Periphery 0.025 −0.003 −1.145 Not supported
H9c-d Change in leverage ↗ Relative
interbank borrowing
Core > Periphery −0.001 0.014 0.583 Not supported
H10c-d Change in leverage ↗ Relative
interbank lending
Core > Periphery −0.011 −0.026 0.123 Not supported
H9d-d  Change in return ↗ Relative interbank
borrowing
Core > Periphery −0.141*** −0.065*** 2.209** Supported
H10d-d Change in return ↗ Relative interbank
lending
Core > Periphery −0.168*** 0.007 7.832*** Supported
H9e-d Growth ↗ Relative interbank
borrowing
Core > Periphery −0.009 −0.1*** −3.516*** Supported
H10e-d Growth ↗ Relative interbank lending Core > Periphery −0.013 0.066*** 1.399 Not supported
H9f-d  Effective federal funds ↗ Relative
interbank borrowing
Core > Periphery −0.033 −0.011 0.416 Not supported
H10f-d Effective federal funds ↗ Relative
interbank lending
Core > Periphery 0.019 −0.009 −0.569 Not supported
Panel  B:Three-tier moderation Unconstrained Std. Coefﬁcients Direct Mediation
z-score
Hyp. Path Predicted Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 vs.
Tier 2
Tier 1 vs.
Tier 3
Tier 2 vs.
Tier 3
Hypothesis
outcome
H9a-d Economic conditions ↗
Relative interbank borrowing
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
−0.357*** −0.094*** −0.099* 4.651*** 2.598*** −0.329 Partially
supported
H10a-d  Economic conditions ↗
Relative interbank lending
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
0.02 −0.196*** −0.284*** −1.718* −3.036*** −2.971*** Partially
supported
H9b-d  Change in liquidity ↗ Relative
interbank borrowing
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
0.003 0.04** 0.016 1.278 0.400 −0.522 Not
supported
H10b-d Change in Liquidity ↗ Relative
interbank lending
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
0.03 0.005 −0.008 −1.177 −1.254 −0.359 Not
supported
H9c-d  Change in leverage ↗ Relative
interbank Borrowing
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
−0.013 0.031 -0.016 1.476 −0.178 −1.306 Not
supported
H10c-d Change in leverage ↗ Relative
interbank lending
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
−0.012 0.004 −0.054** 0.531 −0.307 −1.885* Not
supported
H9d-d  Change in return ↗ Relative
interbank borrowing
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
−0.154*** −0.055*** −0.082*** 2.977*** 1.231 −0.936 Partially
supported
H10d-d Change in return ↗ Relative
interbank lending
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
−0.193*** −0.022 0.039 8.106*** 8.351*** 1.798* Partially
supported
H9e-d  Growth ↗ Relative interbank
borrowing
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
−0.023 −0.092*** −0.093*** −2.377** −2.075** −0.349 Not
supported
H10e-d Growth ↗ Relative interbank
lending
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
−0.024 0.033 0.081*** 1.209 1.962** 1.924* Partially
supported
H9f-d  Effective federal funds ↗
Relative interbank borrowing
Tier 1 > Tier
2  > Tier 3
−0.035 −0.008 −0.079 0.506 −0.977 −1.293 Not
supported
H10f-d  Effective federal funds ↗ Tier 1 > Tier 0.016 −0.055* 0.054 −0.753 0.195 1.604 Not
Relative interbank lending 2  > Tier 3 supported
Note: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
a mediated relationship with interbank activity via growth and change in return. Moreover, we  ﬁnd that interbank market
organization signiﬁcantly moderates interbank activity.
To determine whether the core-periphery partition, proposed for several European countries, is superior to the three-
tier partition as an organizational representation of the US collateralized interbank market, we  ﬁrst examine whether thePlease cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
moderating effect of these alternative organizations is reasonable and useful for interpretation. Second, we analyze which
organization achieves superior model ﬁt in explaining the variance in interbank market activities. Contrary to the ﬁnd-
ings in the literature on European interbank markets, we  ﬁnd that the three-tier organization marginally outperforms the
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Table  9
Comparative goodness of ﬁt (H11).
Sample CMIN/DF CFI RMSEA SRMR
All observations 0.028 1.000 0.000 0.0008
Core  0.116 1.000 0.000 0.0031
Periphery 0.255 1.000 0.000 0.0038
c
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HTier  1 0.049 1.000 0.000 0.0017
Tier 2 0.074 1.000 0.000 0.0012
Tier  3 0.063 1.000 0.000 0.0016
ore-periphery organization in explaining US collateralized interbank market activity largely by capturing the distinct
ehavior of Tier 2 compared to Tiers 1 and 3.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
.ribaf.2016.01.012.
eferences
charya, V.V., Skeie, D., 2011. A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets. J. Monetary Econ. 58 (5), 436–447.
charya, V.V., Yorulmazer, T., 2008. Information contagion and bank herding. J. Money Credit Bank. 40 (1), 215–231.
llen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. J. Polit. Economy 108 (1), 1–33.
llen, L., Peristiani, S., Saunders, A., 1989. Bank size, collateral, and net purchase behavior in the federal funds market: empirical evidence. J. Bus. 62 (4),
501–515.
llen, L., Saunders, A., 1986. The large-small bank dichotomy in the federal funds market. J. Bank. Finance 10 (2), 219–230.
l-Suwailem, S., 2014. Complexity and endogenous instability. Res. Int. Bus. Finance 30, 393–410.
shcraft, A., McAndrews, J., Skeie, D., 2011. Precautionary reserves and the interbank market. J. Money Credit Bank. 43 (s2), 311–348.
agliano, F.C., Morana, C., 2014. Determinants of US ﬁnancial fragility conditions. Res. Int. Bus. Finance 30, 377–392.
agozzi, R.P., Yi, Y., 1988. On the evaluation of structural equation models. J. Acad. Market. Sci. 16 (1), 74–94.
aron, R.M., Kenny, D.A., 1986. The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical
considerations. J. Personal. Social Psychol. 51 (6), 1173.
attiston, S., Gatti, D.D., Gallegati, M.,  Greenwald, B., Stiglitz, J.E., 2012. Default cascades: when does risk diversiﬁcation increase stability? Journal of
Financial Stability 8 (3), 138–149.
aum, C.F., Caglayan, M.,  Ozkan, N., 2009. The second moments matter: the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on the allocation of loanable funds.
Econ.  Lett. 102 (2), 87–89.
ech, M.L., Atalay, E., 2010. The topology of the federal funds market. Physica A: Stati. Mech. Appl. 389 (22), 5223–5246.
entler, P.M., 1990. Comparative ﬁt indexes in structural models. Psychol. Bull. 107 (2), 238.
ernanke, B.S., Gertler, M.,  Gilchrist, S., 1999. The ﬁnancial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework. Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1.,
pp.  1341–1393.
hattacharya, S., Fulghieri, P., 1994. Uncertain liquidity and interbank contracting. Econ. Lett. 44 (3), 287–294.
ollen, K.A., 1989. Structural Equations with Latent Variables. Wiley, New York.
runnermeier, M.K., 2009. Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007–2008. J. Econ. Perspect. 23 (1), 77–100.
yrne, B.M., 2013. Structural Equation Modeling with AMOS: Basic Concepts, Applications and Programming. Routledge.
ampbell, D.T., Fiske, D.W., 1959. Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychol. Bull. 56 (2), 81.
haibi, H., Ftiti, Z., 2015. Credit risk determinants: evidence from a cross-country study. Res. Int. Bus. Finance 33, 1–16.
hiu, T., Fang, D., Chen, J., Wang, Y., Jeris, C.,2001. A robust and scalable clustering algorithm for mixed type attributes in large database environment. In:
KDD’01, Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge discovery and data mining. ACM, New York, pp. 263–268.
occorese, P., 2004. Banking competition and macroeconomic conditions: a disaggregate analysis. J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 14 (3), 203–219.
opeland, A., Davis, I., LeSueur, E., Martin, A., June 2012. Mapping and Sizing the US Repo Market. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street
Economics blog, pp. 25.
opeland, A., Davis, I., LeSueur, E., Martin, A., July, 2014. Lifting the veil on the U.S. bilateral repo market. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street
Economics Blog.
raig, B., von Peter, G., 2014. Interbank tiering and money center banks. J. Financ. Intermed. 23 (3), 322–347.
rocker, L., Algina, J., 1986. Introduction to Classical and Modern Test Theory. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Orlando, FL.
arrugia, D., Graham, M., Yawson, A., 2011. Economic conditions and the motives for multiple open-market share buybacks. Res. Int. Bus. Finance 25 (2),
156–168.
ornell, C., Larcker, D.F., 1981. Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error. J. Market. Res. 18 (1), 39–50.
reixas, X., Parigi, B.M., Rochet, J.C., 2000. Systemic risk, interbank relations, and liquidity provision by the central bank. J. MoneyCredit Bank. 32 (3),
611–638.
reixas, X., Rochet, J.-C., 2008. Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd ed. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA.
reixas, X., Rochet, J.C., Parigi, B.M., 2004. The lender of last resort: a twenty-ﬁrst century approach. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2 (6), 1085–1115.
ricke, D., Lux, T., 2014. Core–periphery structure in the overnight money market: evidence from the e-mid trading platform. Computat. Econ. 45 (3), 1–37.
urﬁne, C.H., 1999. The microstructure of the federal funds market. Financ. Markets Inst. Instrum. 8 (5), 24–44.
askin, J., Godfrey, S., 2014. Successful System-use: It’s Not Just Who  You are But What You Do. SIGHCI at ICIS, Auckland, New Zealand.
askin, J., 2012. GroupDifferences, Stats Tools Package, http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com.
ertler, M.,  Kiyotaki, N., 2010. Financial intermediation and credit policy in business cycle analysis. Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. 3(11)., pp.
547–599.
oldsmith, R.W., 1969. Financial Structure and Development. Yale University Press, New Haven.Please cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
orsuch, R.L., 1983. Factor Analysis. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ.
orton, G., Metrick, A., 2012. Securitized banking and the run on repo. J. Financ. Econ. 104 (3), 425–451.
air, J.F., Black, B., Babin, B., Anderson, R.E., 2010. Multivariate Data Analysis, 7th ed. Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.
annan, T.H., Hanweck, G.A., 1988. Bank insolvency risk and the market for large certiﬁcates of deposit. J. Money Credit Bank. 20 (2), 203–211.
art, O.D., Jaffee, D.M., 1974. On the application of portfolio theory to depository ﬁnancial intermediaries. Rev. Econ. Stud., 129–147.
G Model ARTICLE IN PRESSRIBAF-462; No. of Pages 14
14 M.V. Oet, S.J. Ong / Research in International Business and Finance xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Heider, F., Hoerova, M.,  Holthausen, C., 2008. Liquidity hoarding and interbank market spreads: The role of counterparty risk. European Banking Center
Discussion Paper.
Ho, T.S., Saunders, A., 1985. A micro model of the federal funds market. J. Finance 40 (3), 977–988.
Holmström, B., Tirole, J., 2001. LAPM: a liquidity-based asset pricing model. J. Finance 56 (5), 1837–1867.
Hu, L.-T., Bentler, P.M., 1999. Cut-off criteria for ﬁt indexes in covariance structure analysis: conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Struct. Eq.
Model. 6, 1–55.
Iyer, R., Peydro, J.L., 2011. Interbank contagion at work: evidence from a natural experiment. Rev. Financ. Stud. 24 (4), 1337–1377.
in’t Veld, D., van Lelyveld, I., 2014. Finding the core: network structure in interbank markets. J. Bank. Finance 49 (12), 27–40.
Kaufman, L., Rousseeuw, P.J., 2009. Finding groups in data: an introduction to cluster analysis, vol. 344. John Wiley & Sons.
King, R.G., Levine, R., 1993. Finance and growth: schumpeter might be right. Quart. J. Econ. 108 (3), 717–737.
King, T.B., 2008. Discipline and liquidity in the interbank market. J. Money Credit Bank. 40 (2–3), 295–317.
Koehn, M.,  Santomero, A.M., 1980. Regulation of bank capital and portfolio risk. J. Finance 35 (5), 1235–1244.
Krippendorff, K., 2012. Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology. Sage Publications Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA.
Langﬁeld, S., Liu, Z., Ota, T., 2014. Mapping the UK interbank system. J. Bank. Finance 45 (8), 288–303.
McKinnon, R.I., 1973. Money and Capital in Economic Development. Brookings Institution Press.
Moshirian, F., Wu,  Q., 2012. Banking industry volatility and economic growth. Res. Int. Bus. Finance 26 (3), 428–442.
Pagano, M.,  1993. Financial markets and growth: an overview. Eur. Econ. Rev. 37 (2), 613–622.
Pasiouras, F., Kosmidou, K., 2007. Factors inﬂuencing the proﬁtability of domestic and foreign commercial banks in the European Union. Res. Int. Bus.
Finance 21 (2), 222–237.
Pearl, J., 2012. The causal foundations of structural equation modeling. In: Hoyle, H. (Ed.), Handbook of Structural Equation Modeling. Guilford Press, New
York.
Peterson, R.A., Kim, Y., 2013. On the relationship between coefﬁcient alpha and composite reliability. J. Appl. Psychol. 98 (1), 194.
Rochet, J.C., 1992. Capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks. Eur. Econ. Rev. 36 (5), 1137–1170.
Rochet, J.C., Tirole, J., 1996. Interbank lending and systemic risk. J. Money Credit Bank. 28 (4), 733–762.
Rochet, J.C., Vives, X., 2004. Coordination failures and the lender of last resort: was  Bagehot right after all? J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2 (6), 1116–1147.
Rose, P.S., Kolari, J.W., 1985. Early warning systems as a monitoring device for bank condition. Quart. J. Bus. Econ. 24 (1), 43–60.
Rousseeuw, P.J., 1987. Silhouettes: a graphical aid to the interpretation and validation of cluster analysis. J. Computat. Appl. Math. 20, 53–65.
Salop, S.C., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell J. Econ., 141–156.
Satorra, A., Bentler, P.M., 2001. A scaled difference chi-square test statistic for moment structure analysis. Psychometrika 66 (4), 507–514.
Shaw, E.S., 1973. Financial Deepening in Economic Development. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Soramaki, K., Bech, M.L., Arnold, J., Glass, R.J., Beyeler, W.E., 2007. The topology of interbank payment ﬂows. Physica A: Stati. Mech. Appl. 379 (1), 317–333.
Steiger, J.H., Lind, J.C., 1980. Statistically based tests for the number of common factors, 758. Annual Meeting of the Psychometric Society, Iowa City, IA.,Please cite this article in press as: Oet, M.V., Ong, S.J., From organization to activity in the US collateralized interbank
market. Res. Int. Business Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.012
pp.  424–453.
Stigum, M.L., 1989. The Repo and Reverse Markets. Dow Jones-Irwin, Homewood, IL.
Stigum, M.,  Crescenzi, A., 2007. Stigum’s Money Market, 4th ed. McGraw Hill Companies, New York.
Tedeschi, G., Mazloumian, A., Gallegati, M.,  Helbing, D., 2012. Bankruptcy cascades in interbank markets. PLoS ONE 7 (12), e52749.
Zhang, T., Ramakrishnan, R., Livny, M.,  1996. BIRCH: An efﬁcient data clustering method for very large databases. ACM SIGMOD Record 25 (2), 103–114.
